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Abstract I argue that Blackfoot’s method of marking repetition, mattsista’- consists
of two morphemes, matt- and ista’-. While both encode an additional event, matt-’s
event is restricted only to being a focus alternative to the asserted event, leaving
predicate identity and temporal precedence to be encoded by ista’-. I propose that
ista’-’s event variable requires a linguistically encoded antecedent which matt-’s
event acts as, deriving the fact that mattsista’- has a focus-sensitive interpretation.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I investigate how Blackfoot (Plains Algonquian) encodes repetition.
By “repetition,” I refer to the meaning encoded by English words like again, as in
(1). Where the prejacent in (1) “I ran” indicates a running event, e, by the speaker,
“again” indicates that there was some other event, e′, which temporally preceded the
asserted event, where both e and e′ have the property of being running events by the
speaker (cf. Dowty 1979; Fabricius-Hansen 2001; von Stechow 1996; Beck 2006).
(1) I ran again
The way Blackfoot encodes this sort of meaning is illustrated in (2). Like
English, the Blackfoot utterance has a prejacent part nit-okska’si which means “I
ran”, and repetition (i.e., temporal precedence and an identical property condition
between e’ and e) is encoded by what Frantz & Russell (1989) gloss as a single
morpheme meaning “again”, mattsista’-.
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(2) nimáttsistáó’kska’si
nit-mattsista’-okska’si
1-again-run.vai
‘I ran again.’1
At first glance mattsista’- and again appear parallel, but whereas English again is
felicitous in either a repetitive or restitutive context, restitutive readings for Blackfoot
mattsista’- are strongly focus-sensitive, only being available in agent-focus contexts.
My main claim is that mattsista’- consists of two morphemes: matt- and ista’-,
where the markedness of the restitutive reading can be compositionally derived. I
show that matt- is typically interpreted as additive VP-focus,2 presupposing that the
agent of the asserted event also participated as agent of another salient event, and
suggest that ista’- encodes the temporal precedence and identity condition associated
with English again. I propose that ista’- has stricter requirements than again,
however, as to how its anaphoric dependency must be satisfied: while the event
referred to by again may be extralinguistically supplied via context, the denotation
of ista’- includes an event variable that must obtain its reference from a linguistically
encoded event. I suggest that the event associated with matt- satisfies this local
dependency, such that the events presupposed by matt- and ista’- are identified as
the same event, and then show how this, along with default VP-focus, derives the
consequence that matt- and ista’- together require a fully repetitive interpretation.
In the remainder of section 1, I provide background on the repetitive/restitutive
ambiguity, then show that Blackfoot mattsista’- appears to lack this ambiguity. In
section 2, I provide evidence that mattsista’- is morphologically complex. In section
3, I propose denotations for matt- and ista’-, and show how these compositionally
combine to derive the lack of ambiguity seen in section section 1. In section 4, I
address consequences for analysis, regarding non-default focal contexts. In section
5, I conclude.
1 Glosses: vai/vii= (in)animate intransitive verb, vta/vti=transitive (in)animate verb, 1,2=1st/2nd per-
son, 3=3rd proximate, 3’=3rd obviative, 0=inanimate, loc=local person (1st or 2nd), X>Y= X acts on
Y, inv=inverse(X acts on Y, Y outranks X on person-animacy hierarchy: 2,1 >3>3’>0), rl=relative
root, sbj=subjunctive, cj=conjunctive, conj=“and/but”, impf=imperfective, perf=perfect, fut=future,
caus=causative, ints=intensifier, neg=negation, nonaff=non-affirmative, recip=reciprocal, n.fact=non-
factive, dtp=distinct third person, y/n= yes/no Q, dem=demonstrative, pl=plural, sg=singular,
exp=expletive, ic=initial change (morphononological process). Blackfoot data, unless otherwise
marked, is from author’s fieldwork notes, organized/marked by (Consultant:YYYY-MM-DD)
2 Note that when I use the term “VP,” I do so under the assumption that agents are introduced VP-
externally, in the sense of Kratzer 1996
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1.1 The repetitive/restitutive ambiguity
English again is a presuppositional element requiring some event, which matches
the asserted event’s properties, to have temporally preceded the asserted event.
The presupposition is often characterized as ambiguous, however, in that it may
be satisfied in more than one way - either repetitively, or restitutively (cf. Dowty
1979; Fabricius-Hansen 2001; von Stechow 1996; Beck 2006). The readings are
illustrated below, where the utterance in (3) can either presuppose (a) that I opened
the door before (the fully repetitive reading), or (b) that the door was open before
(the restitutive reading).
(3) I opened the door again
a. Repetitive: I opened that door when I came in, but the wind blew it shut. So I
opened the door again
b. Restitutive: That door was already open when I came in, but the wind blew it
shut. So I opened the door again
The distinction thus corresponds to whether the entire asserted event is a repeti-
tion of the presupposed event (the repetitive reading), or whether it is just the the
result state of the asserted event that is a repetition of the presupposed event (the
restitutive reading).
There are two main approaches to capturing this ambiguity theoretically. The
structural account (cf. von Stechow 1996) argues that there is one lexical entry for
again, but that predicates like open are syntactically decomposable into an empty
agentive v, and a result state. When again adjoins to a phrase structure encoding
just the result state, prior to the merge of v, the restitutive meaning is derived. When
again adjoins after v has merged, i.e., when it adjoins to a phrase structure that
encodes an event corresponding to [cause [result state]], the fully repetitive meaning
is derived.
The lexicalist account (cf. Dowty 1979) avoids positing syntactic decomposition
and instead posits lexical ambiguity for again, such that it consists of two lexemes,
again1 and again2; one lexeme corresponds to the restitutive meaning, the other to
the repetitive meaning.3
3 See von Stechow 1996 for a criticism of Dowty’s meanings for again1 and again2, as well as a
criticism of Fabricius-Hansen’s (2001) repetitive and counter-directional again.
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1.2 Blackfoot mattsista’- lacks restitutive readings
Unlike English again, Blackfoot mattsista’- at first appears incompatible with resti-
tutive readings. (4a) shows its felicity in a fully-repetitive context. (4b) shows its
infelicity in a restitutive context. 4
(4) nimáttsistá’kowai’piksí’p (I opened it again)
a. Repetitive: omi
omi
dem
kitsím
kitsim
door
nitsíkowai’piksí’p,
nit-ikowai’piksi-’p
1-open-loc>0
nitáitsipissi
nit-á-it-ipi-ssi
1-impf-rl-enter-cj
itsohkohpápoka.
it-yohkohpápoka
rl-blow.shut
ki
ki
conj
nimatts(it)sistai’kowai’piksí’p
ni-matt-(it)-ista’-ikowai’piksi-’p
1-add-(rl)-again-open.vti-loc>0
‘I opened that door when I went in, but then it blew shut.
And (then) I opened it again.’ (BB:2010-04-16)
b. Restitutive: omi
omi
dem
kitsím
kitsim
door
ííkaikowaistsii,
iikaa-ikowaistsii
perf-open.vii
nitáitsipissi
nit-á-it-ipi-ssi
1-impf-rl-enter-cj
itsohkohpápoka.
it-yohkohpápoka
rl-blow.shut
#ki
ki
conj
nimatts(it)sistai’kowai’piksí’p
ni-matt-(it)-ista’-ikowai’piksi-’p
1-add-(rl)-again-open-loc>0
‘That door was already open when I went in, then it blew shut.
# And (then) I opened it again.’ (BB:2010-04-16)
This generalisation is robust; (5) shows a context where a restitutive presupposi-
tion is satisfied, but a mattsista’-marked utterance is nonetheless rejected.
(5) Context: Last year, Solveiga caught Abigail, a criminal. Then she escaped prison,
but yesterday, I caught her again.
#nimáttsistáyinimata
ni-matt-ista’-yinniM-at-a
1-add-again-catch.vta-?-loc>3
ana
an-wa
dem-3
Abigail
Abigail
abigail
‘I caught Abigail again.’ (BB:2009-03-10)
BB comment: That means YOU caught her before, you caught her twice.
4 Note that in anticipation of my analysis, I will gloss matt- as “add(itive),” and ista’- as “again.’
Except in cases where I am entertaining the possibility that mattsista’- is a single morpheme, in order
to argue against it.
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The question is how to account for this generalisation. Adopting a structural
account, we could stipulate that mattsista’- is unable to merge in a position where
it only scopes over a result state. Adopting a lexical view, we could assume that
Blackfoot mattsista’- corresponds to the English repetitive again, and that Blackfoot
lacks a lexical item corresponding to restitutive again. I argue that neither of these
possibilities account for the full-picture, as both fail to acknowledge my main
empirical claim– the claim that mattsista’- is compositionally complex, consisting of
two morphemes matt- and ista’-. In the following section, I provide morphological
evidence for this claim.
2 Evidence for mattsista’-’s complexity
2.1 Other morphemes can intervene between matt- and ista’-
The first piece of evidence for the proposed decomposition is shown in (6)-(8), where
we see that other morphemes can occur inside mattsista’- intervening between matt-
and ista’-. In (6) the ability modal ohkott- intervenes, in (7), the imperfective á-
intervenes, in (8), the “means” linker ooht- intervenes. 5
(6) nitáákattohkottsista’sai’notok
nit-áák-matt-ohkott-ista’-áásei’n-oto-k
1-fut-add-able-again-cry.vai-caus-inv
‘She will be able to make me cry again.’ (BB:2008-11-03)
(7) annohk
annohk
now
nimattáistáóyi
ni-matt-á-ista’-ooyi
1-add-impf-again-eat.vai
áápastaaminaam(iksi)
áápastaaminaam-(iksi)
apple-pl
‘Right now I’‘m eating apples again.’ (BB:2009-02-19)
(8) nimáttoohtsistayistsini’p
ni-matt-ooht-ista’-yistsini-’p
1-add-means-again-cut.vti-loc>0
isttowan
isttowan
knife
‘I cut it again with a knife.’ (BB:2009-02-23)
2.2 matt- can appear independently
The second piece of evidence for mattsista’-’s complexity is that matt- can oc-
cur independently, which is what we predict if mattsista’- is indeed composed
5 Recall also, that the relative root it- “then” intervenes between matt- and ista’-, as seen in example
(4).
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of separate morphemes. Frantz & Russell’s (1989) dictionary glosses matt- as
“again/additionally”; in my fieldwork I find that matt- most consistently corresponds
to an additive VP-focusing “also/too”, being used in contexts where the agent of the
event is presupposed to be participating (or have participated) as the agent of some
other event (9).
(9) nimattáókska’si
ni-matt-á-okska’si
1-add-impf-run.vai
‘I run also.’ e.g. I ride horses, I also run (BB:2009-03-10)
2.3 matt- and mattsista’- are in complementary distribution
The third piece of evidence indicating that mattsista’- contains the morpheme matt-
is that the two forms cannot co-occur. This is shown in (10-11), where the consultant
was given a felicitous English utterance with both also and again, and asked to
translate into Blackfoot. In all cases, the consultant offered the (a) examples,
containing only matt(s-)ista’-. The elicitor then offered the constructed examples
in (b), with matt- to contribute the meaning of also and a full-form mattsista’-
to contribute the meaning of again, however these constructed utterances were
categorically rejected.
(10) Target: I ran again, and I also jumped again.
a. nimáttsistókska’si
ni-matt-ista’-okska’si
1-add-again-run.vai
ki
ki
conj
nimattsistá’sspohpai’pi
ni-matt-ista’-ssp-ohpai’pi
1-add-again-up-jump.vai
’I ran again, and I jumped again.’
b. *nimáttsistókska’si
ni-matt-ista’-okska’si
1-add-again-run.vai
ki
ki
conj
nimattattsistá’sspohpai’pi
ni-matt-mattsista’-ssp-ohpai’pi
1-add-again-up-jump.vai
Target: I ran again, and I also jumped again. (BB:2010-04-01)
(11) Target: She will dance again, and she will also sing again
a. áákattsistaiíhpiyi
áák-matt-ista’-ihpiyi
fut-add-again-dance.vai
ki
ki
conj
áákattsistai’inihki
áák-matt-ista’-inihki
fut-add-again-sing.vai
’She is gonna dance again, and she is gonna sing again
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b. *áákattsistaiíhpiyi
áák-matt-ista’-ihpiyi
fut-add-again-dance.vai
ki
ki
conj
áákattattsistai’inihki
áák-matt-mattsista’-inihki
fut-add-again-sing.vai
Target: She will dance again, and she will also sing again. (BB:2010-04-01)
This complementary distribution is expected if mattsista’- consists of matt- and
ista’-; it would require a separate explanation if matt- and mattsista’- were unrelated.
Note that while matt- is sometimes compatible with a translation as “again,” as
suggested by Frantz & Russell’s (1989) gloss, matt- is not merely a short-form, or
fast-speech variant of mattsista’-, as they have different semantic properties: while
mattsista’- necessarily imposes a temporal ordering on the presupposed and asserted
event, as shown in (12), this is not the case for matt-. This is shown in (13), where
the matt- marked asserted event need not temporally follow the presupposed event.
(12) #anihk
anihk
earlier.today
nitsspiyi
nit-ihpiyi
1-dance.vai
ki
ki
and
matonni
matonni
yesterday
nimattsistai’ihpiyi
ni-matt-ista’-ihpiyi
1-add-again-dance.vai
‘`I danced today, and I danced yesterday also/ # again.’ (BB:2009-05-05)
(13) Context: In the morning, I[S2] made cookies (e). In the afternoon, I baked a pie (e′).
My neighbour[S1] visits and asks:
S1: “Did you bake that pie?”
S2: áá,
áá,
yes,
ki
ki
conj
omistsi
om-istsi
dem-pl
pisatskiitaanists
pisat-ihkiitaan-istsi
fancy-bake-0pl
nimattsskiitatoopyaa
ni-matt-ihkiitaatoo-’p-yaa
1-add-bake.vti-loc>0-3pl
“Yes, and I also baked those cookies.” (BB:2010-03-15)
Recall too that the repetitive meaning associated with English again consisted not
only of a temporal precedence requirement, but also an identical property condition.
The data below shows that while mattsista’-, like again, encodes an identical property
condition (as indicated by the consultant’s comments in (14)), matt- does not (as
shown by matt-’s felicity in example (15)).
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(14) P = freezing, P′ = freezing, freezing = freezing
matonni
matonni
day.before
mattsista’kokoto
matt-ista’-iko’koto-wa
add-again-freeze.vii-3
omi
om-yi
dem-0
isstonnikis
isstonniki-s
ice-cream-?
‘Yesterday the ice-cream froze again.’ (BB:2009-03-10)
BB Comment: It’s like the ice-cream froze before, melted, and then now it’s
freezing again
(15) P = singing, P′ = dancing, singing 6= dancing
ana
ana
dem
Heather
Heather
Heather
kámínihkisi
kam-inihki-si
if-sing.vai-sbj:3
áákattsspiyi
áák-matt-ihpiyi
fut-add-dance.vai
’If Heather sings, she will also dance.’ (BB:2010-03-24)
With these observations, in the following section I posit denotations for matt- and
ista’-. I then show how these denotations combine to derive mattsista’-’s apparent
incompatibility with restitutive contexts.
3 Composing mattsista’-
3.1 A semantics for Blackfoot matt-
Recall that Frantz & Russell (1989) gloss matt- as “again” or “additionally,” and that
in my fieldwork, matt- most often corresponds to an additive VP-focusing “also”
or “too.” The basic analyses for English “again” and the additive focus particles
“also” and “too” are given in (16) and (17). (16) states that again presupposes that
in addition to the asserted event, e, there exists a previous event, e′, where the event
predicate, P, which is being asserted of e, also holds for e′.
(16) Lexical Entry for again
Let P be a property of eventualities and let e be an eventuality.JagainK(P)(e) is defined only if ∃e′[JMAXK(P)(e) = 1∧ e′ <t e].
Where defined, JagainK(P)(e) = 1 iff P(e) = 1.
(cf. von Stechow 1996: 95)6
6 The inclusion of a MAX operator in the denotation ensures that we do not just indicate a continuing
event, i.e., cases where we would use still. JMAXK(P)(e) = 1 iff P(e) and there is no e′ such that e is
a proper subpart of e′ and P(e′) = 1. (von Stechow 1996).
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(17) Lexical Entry for also/too
Let JαKo = p, C = the contextJalsoK(p) only defined if C provides p, p′ ∈ JαKF , p′ 6= JαKo, & p′(w) = 1
Where defined, JalsoK(p)(w) = 1 iff p(w) = 1
(cf. Rooth 1992; Karttunen & Peters 1979)
As focus alternatives describe events which match the asserted event’s proper-
ties, taking into account abstraction over focus-marked elements, also, like again,
presupposes that there exists some event which matches the asserted event according
to some property. For again, this is the property of events attributed to the asserted
event; for also this is the focus-abstracted property that all of the focus-alternatives
have in common. Since matt- is most often translated as also or again; this sug-
gests that matt-’s core semantics indicates that in addition to the asserted event, e,
a presupposed event e′, occurred (or occurs), where e and e′ share some property.
Note, however, that matt- is not always translated as also or again. In many cases,
matt- is not translated at all. Consider the minimal pair in (18); (18a) is marked
with the additive agent-focus marker noohkatt-7; its offered English translation
correspondingly contains an “also.” In contrast, (18b) is only marked with matt-;
its offered English translation lacks an overt element encoding whatever semantic
import matt- may contribute.
(18)
a. oma
oma
dem
imitaa
imitaa
dog
ííkohpokimi,
iik-ohpokimi
ints-small.vai
ki
ki
and
oma
oma
dem
poos
poos
cat
iikoohkattohpokimi
iik-noohkatt-ohpokimi
ints-also-small.vai
‘That dog is small, and that cat is small also.’
b. oma
oma
dem
imitaa
imitaa
dog
ííkohpokimi
iik-ohpokimi
ints-small.vai
ki
ki
and
oma
oma
dem
poos
poos
cat
iikattohpokimi
iik-matt-ohpokimi
ints-add-small.vai
‘That dog is small, and that cat is small.’
BB comment:“[This one is] without the ’also’ - ikoohkatt- is ‘also’. It’s like you’re
looking at a cat and you’re looking at a bowl, and they’re both small, without the
‘also’” (BB:2010-02-08)
7 Whereas matt- is generally used for additive VP-focus, noohkatt- is generally used for additive
agent-focus. There is evidence that noohkatt, like mattsista’-, is complex, consisting of a morpheme
noohk- as well as additive matt-. I leave this for further research.
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Consider also the data provided by the exchange between elicitor (ML) and
consultant (BB) in (19). When produced out-of-the-blue, utterances with matt- are
infelicitous, shown in (19a), unless matt- is purposely used to flout Grice’s Maxim of
Quantity,8 in order to shock the addressee into asking clarifying questions and thus
open up a conversation. This is suggested by the consultant’s comments in (19b),
and the exchange of comments between elicitor and consultant in (19c).
(19)
a. ML: #nimáttsistohkohpi
ni-matt-istokohpi
1-add-fall.down.vai
Target: I also fell down
BB: That’s not good. Well, that’s like if you’re telling a story, e.g. telling
your friend (19b)
b. BB: kei
kei
exp
má,
ma,
exp,
nimáttsistohkohpi
ni-matt-istohkohpi
1-add-fall.down.vai
“Holy, I fell down!”
BB: Like an opening for a conversation, so the person you’re talking to will
ask you “what happened to you? How did you fall?” So you can tell
more about what happened.
c. ML: And if I say kei
kei
exp
má,
ma,
exp,
nitsistohkohpi
nit-istohkohpi
1-fall.down.vai
?
BB: “Holy, I fell down”
BB: “Holy, I fell down.” You know what happened to me? I fell. I went and
fell.
ML: So if you just say nitsistohkohpi it doesn’t open up the conversation like
nimáttsistohkohpi?
BB: Yeah. (BB:2010-01-27)
8 This can be viewed as a violation of Grice’s Maxim of Quantity. matt- presupposes that both SAPs
are aware of some event, e′, that is somehow related to the asserted event. Uttering a matt- marked
utterance out-of-the-blue is thus less informative than is required for the purposes of the conversation,
as the Addressee will be left unaware of what event, e′, the asserted event is meant to stand in relation
to. Pat Littell suggested this interpretation of the exchange in (19) to me.
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This use of matt- indicates that the asserted event is part of a set of events,
however the members of this set may be connected in terms of their temporal
precedence, or their contribution to a story, and need not be characterized as a set
of events which are connected because each member shares a common property.9
Taking these data into account, I propose that matt- has a broader meaning than
either again or also, such that it merely presupposes that the asserted event is a
member of a (non-singleton) partially-ordered set of events, the identity of which is
contextually resolved. This is in (20):
(20) Lexical Entry for matt-
Let e be the asserted event, E be a set of partially ordered events (available in
the context), and e′′ be a contextually-salient event. Then,Jmatt−Ke′′,E =
λP<l,<s,t>>λeλw : [e ∈ E&e′′ ∈ E&e′′ 6= e&e′′ ≤p w].P(e)(w)
So matt- presupposes that the asserted event, e, is a member of a poset of events,
E, where at least one member of E, call it e′′, is a part of the actual world. In the
basic case, where matt- is interpreted as additive VP-focus also/too, E is taken to
be the set derived by applying the sum operation over the set of events in which the
Agent of the asserted event, e, participated as agent. I suggest that this resolution of
E is an artifact of basic pragmatic principles, i.e., that in default elicitation contexts,
with no previous information structure present, one assumes that the agent of the
asserted event maps onto the topic/protagonist of discourse, whose adventures we
follow. This sets up a context where the discourse is expected to consist of utterances
describing different actions by the agent– the set of events which exemplify a VP-
focus p-set. Assuming an algebraic view of events (cf. Bach 1986; Bonomi &
Casalegno 1993; Krifka 1989), this set of events can then be extended by the sum
relation to create a superset which is partially ordered by the part-of relation. In
the cases where matt- is interpreted as again, E corresponds to the poset of events
derived by applying the sum operation over the set of events exemplifying the VP-
denotation. In the broadest case, such as in (18) and (19), E can be taken as a set of
events described in a temporally ordered discourse/narrative.
9 Although perhaps the use in (19) could be construed of as referring to a set of events with the abstract
property “contributing-to-story-X.” I leave for further speculation the issue of whether the all of the
events in the set that matt- makes reference to must be characterised by a common property. If so, the
data in (19) would seem to indicate that the common property need not a linguistic representation,
but can be purely pragmatic.
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3.2 A semantics for Blackfoot ista’-
Recall the prediction that if mattsista’- consists of matt- and ista’-, then matt- and
ista’- should occur independently. This was the case for matt-, however (21) shows
that ista’- always requires matt- in order to be used grammatically:
(21)
a. *nitsistá´oyi
nit-ista’-ooyi
1-again-eat.vai
Target: I ate again (BB:2009-02-19)
BB Comment: short form of nimattsistá´oyi, but not good Blackfoot. You’re leaving
bits out
b. anahk
anahk
dem
Amelia
Amelia
Amelia
istai’ihpiyi
ista’-ihpiyi-wa
again-dance.vai-3
Target: Amelia danced again (BB:2009-03-23)
c. *anáhk
anahk
dem
amelia
Amelia
Amelia
ista’wáásai’ni
ista’-waasai’ni-wa
again-cry.vai-3
Target: Amelia cried again (BB:2009-03-23)
Recall, however, that the semantic properties of matt- and mattsista’- differ in
two major ways. mattsista’- encodes a strict temporal precedence and an identical
property requirement where matt- does not. I propose that ista’- is the component of
mattsista’- encoding these properties, i.e., the basic meaning of again.
(22) Lexical Entry for ista’-Jista′−K=λP<l,<s,t»λe: [JMAXK (P)(e’)=1 & e’ <t e]. P(e)
As for the inability of ista’- to occur on its own, I propose that ista’- has stricter
requirements than again as to how its anaphoric dependency must be satisfied:
while the event variable referred to by again, e′, may be contextually supplied,
extra-linguistically, I propose that the event variable encoded by ista’-, e′, is parallel
to the individual variable associated with English reflexives like himself, in that the
variables associated with ista’- and himself must be co-indexed with local linguistic
antecedents. The event encoded by matt-, I suggest, acts to satisfy this dependency.
I.e., matt-’s event, e′′, is taken as ista’-’s antecedent. This is schematized in (23):
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(23)
Just as himself must be co-indexed with with a referential expression like John
in (23a), the event variable associated with ista’- must be co-indexed with the event
variable introduced by matt-. The ungrammaticality of the bare ista’- examples is
thus parallel to the ungrammaticality of the un-coindexed reflexive in (23a’). A
consequence of the proposed analysis for ista’- is that the events introduced by matt-
and ista’-, e′′ and e′ respectively, must be co-indexed. I.e., e′′ and e′ are taken to refer
to the same event.10 In the following section, I show how this derives mattsista’-’s
lack of restitutive readings in default focal contexts.
3.3 Deriving full repetition
Consider a derivation where both matt- and ista’- attach to an expression approxi-
mating “I closed the door.” With such a construction, three events are relevant. First,
the asserted event, e, which must be an event of the speaker closing the door (24a).
Second, the event presupposed by matt-, e′′, which in default contexts, must belong
to a poset of events, E, derived by applying the sum operation over the set of events
exemplifying a VP-focus p-set, as in (24b). This event, e′′, thus must have a form
parallel to (24c). Third, the event presupposed by ista’-, e′, which we may assume
can be interpreted as either repetitive, or restitutive. The event e′, then, may be as in
(24d i), where e′ is interpreted as an event of the speaker having previously closed
the door (the repetitive reading), or e′ may be as in (24d ii), where e′ is interpreted
as an event(uality) of the door having been previously closed.
10 Notice that this is similar to Beck’s (2006) account for blocking restitutive readings in specific focal
contexts in English. Beck’s analysis, however, is purely pragmatic, which while sufficient to account
for the English data, would not be able to account for the more strictly restricted Blackfoot data
shown above (i.e., the fact that ista’- cannot occur by itself).
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(24)
a. e = [I closed the door]
b. {I closed the door, I swam, I sang, I wrote a science-fiction novel...}
c. e′′ = [ I VP-ed]
d. e′ =
i) [I closed the door before] (Repetitive)
ii) [The door was closed before] (Restitutive)
If the events e′ and e′′ must be co-indexed, as proposed, matt-’s presupposed
event e′′ must then be interpreted as the same event as either the event in (24d
i), or the event in (24d ii). Under a full-repetition interpretation, this amounts to
the equation in (25a), i.e., equating an event of the speaker VP-ing, with an event
of the speaker having closed the door before. This is pragmatically coherent; the
repetitively interpreted event, e′, of the speaker having closed the door before, is
consistent with the requirement on e′′ that e′′ be of the form (24c). On the other hand,
under a restitutive interpretation, this amounts to the equation in (25b), i.e., equating
an event of the speaker VP-ing, with an event of the door having been closed before.
This, I argue, is pragmatically incoherent, under the assumption that events must
have the same argument structure and/or aspectual type, in order to be identified as
the same event. I propose that this pragmatic incoherency is what accounts for the
original observation from section 1.2, i.e., the observation that Blackfoot mattsista’-
appears to lack restitutive readings.
(25)
a. e′′ = e′ [ I VP-ed] = [I closed the door before] (Repetitive)
b. e′′ = e′ [ I VP-ed] = [The door was closed before] (Restitutive)
4 Restoring restitutive readings with agent focus
Here I address the consequences of my analysis; in particular, I address the fact
that the account proposed crucially relies on default focus falling on the VP. The
prediction is that in contexts forcing focus to be interpreted elsewhere, e.g., on the
agent, the pragmatic incoherency ruling out restitutive readings may disappear. This
appears to be the case, as shown by (26); when a preceding question overrides default
focus so that focus is interpreted on the agent, mattsista’- is felicitous in a restitutive
context:
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(26) Context: We are in a room where the door is closed, but the wind blows it open. I
notice that it is starting to get cold, so I get up to go close it, but when I get to the
door, I realise that it’s already closed. I (S1) ask, and S2 answers:
S1: “Who closed the door?”
S2: Aná
an-wa
dem-3
Kánaisskinaa
kánaisskinaa
mouse
mattsistá’yookimayi
matt-ista’-yookii-m-ayi
add-again-close.vti-3>0-dtp
“Kanaisskinaa (Mouse) closed it again.”
The sudden availability of a restitutive reading in different focal contexts can also
be seen in (27). First note that (27a) and (27b) were presented in the same restitutive
context. The initial utterance in (27a) questions the existence of an agent who caught
Abigail, i.e., making salient a set of catching-Abigail events, which vary over agents.
Here a felicitous use of mattsista’- is allowed. The initial utterance in (27b) merely
makes salient an event where Abigail was caught versus an event(uality) where she
was not, however, and the use of mattsista’- is infelicitous.
(27) Context: Last year, Solveiga caught Abigail, a criminal, for the first time. Now I’m
the new sheriff in town, and Abigail has escaped jail.
a. S1: “Did anybody catch Abigail?”
S2: Aa,
Aa,
Yes,
nimattsistayissinototowa
ni-matt-ista’-yissinoto-a
1-add-again-catch.vta-loc>3
anahk
anahk
dem
Abigail
Abigail
Abigail
“Yes, I caught her again.” (BB: 2010-03-24)
b. S1: “Did Abigail get caught?”
S2: #Aa,
Aa,
Yes,
nimattsistayissinototowa
ni-matt-ista’-yissinoto-a
1-add-again-catch.vta-loc>3
(anahk
(anahk
(dem
Abigail)
Abigail)
Abigail)
“Yes, I caught her again.”
S2’: Aa,
aa,
Yes,
nikayíssinotowa
ni-akaa-yissinoto-a
1-perfect-catch.vta-loc>3
(anahk
(anahk
(dem
Abigail)
Abigail)
Abigail)
“Yes, I caught Abigail.” (BB: 2010-04-01)
The availability of restitutive readings in agent-focus contexts is not surprising
under the proposed account, although some explanation is required. With focus
on the subject, the mattsista’- marked utterance in (26) should have the following
properties:
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Asserted event: e = [Kanaisskinaa closed the door]
matt-event: e′′ = [AGENT closed the door]
ista’-event: e′ = [Kanaisskinaa closed the door before](repetitive) OR
e′ = [The door was closed before](restitutive)
Under the analysis provided here, the events presupposed by matt- and ista’- are
identified as the same event. While the matt- event of someone else closing the
door and a restitutively presupposed event of the door being closed before differ in
their argument structure and aspectual type (disallowing identification), an event
of the door being closed before is compatible with being identified as a part of, or
sub-event of the matt- event, i.e., its result state sub-event. I suggest that this is what
allows for the restitutive meanings in (26)-(27).
This requires that Blackfoot grammatically encodes sub-events for the predicates
used in (26)-(27); recall that I have posited that ista’- necessarily take its reference
from a grammatically encoded event. Compare the data in (28) to that of (27), where
the contexts and focal-setting questions are parallel, however the predicate differs.
In (28), unlike (27), the restitutive context with a agent-focus-setting question does
not license the use of mattsista’-. This suggests that the lexical predicates differ as
to whether they grammatically encode result-state sub-events11.
(28) Context: Joel and Jen are in class, but since Joel hasn’t slept for ages, he falls asleep.
I (S2) tell S1 about this, and S1 asks:
S1: “Did anybody wake up Joel?”
S2: #Aa,
aa,
yes,
ana
ana
dem.3
Jen
Jen
Jen
máttsistaiksikini
matt-ista’-iksikin-yii
add-again-wake.vta-3>3’
ani
ani
dem.3’
Joel
Joel
Joel
“#Yes, Jen woke up Joel again” (BB: 2010-03-24)
BB comment: mattsistai’ is again, so it doesn’t work for that sentence
More significantly, this suggests that the event variables encoded in presupposi-
tions may not be monolithic, but instead may have more internal structure than has
been assumed.
11 This reliance on lexical specification also accounts for why the example in 3.3 cannot be similarly
analysed. The example in 3.3 involved a focus-abstracted VP, which does not lexically encode a
result-state sub-event.
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5 Conclusion and issues for further research
I have argued that Blackfoot’s primary method of marking repetition, mattsista’-
consists of two morphemes matt- and ista’-. I proposed separate denotations for each
morpheme, in order to account for their separate distributional and semantic prop-
erties, as well as their combined semantic effect. The course of investigating matt-
and ista’- has provided insight into how Blackfoot, and language in general, may
grammatically encodes events. For instance, the availability of restitutive readings in
agent-focus contexts follow from the given analysis only if the representation of pre-
supposed events includes internal structure (i.e., sub-events) that the compositional
system can access. While several researchers have posited internal structure with
respect to the asserted event (cf. Ramchand 2008; Travis 2000; Tenny 1989, 1994),
to my knowledge, internal structure is not usually attributed to the event variables
lexically encoded in presuppositions. However if, as I have suggested for Blackfoot,
the availability of internal structure is lexically specified for each predicate, this
specification should hold for any event that the predicate is applied to, whether
the event is asserted or presupposed.12 Whether internal structure in presupposed
entities is a mechanism available to every language, or whether languages differ as
to how/whether they structure their presupposed entities, I leave for further research.
A final thing to note is that I have implicitly assumed that while matt-’s presupposed
event, e′′, can act as an antecedent to ista’-’s presupposed event, e′, the asserted
event, e, may not. Similarly, I have assumed that an event quantifier (e.g. aspect,
temporal modifiers) may not bind the event variable ista’- introduces. I suggest that
this follows from the fact that the relevant event variables/binders are in different
domains. I.e., that the events introduced by matt- and ista’- are confined to the
presuppositional domain, that the asserted event and event quantifiers like aspect are
confined to the domain of assertion, and that dependency relations like binding and
co-indexation only operate domain-internally. Thus while the domain of assertion
and the domain or presupposition may be more parallel than previously assumed,
the two domains must nonetheless be separate.
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